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Banning Bans on New Reproductive and Novel Genetic
Technologies
Matthew Herder†

Abstract:

haps then commentators will actually theorize about the
harms, or lack thereof, of particular NRTs and NGTs.

C

ommentators argue that statutory prohibitions with
the force of the criminal law should not be used to
regulate new reproductive technologies (NRTs) and
novel genetic technologies (NGTs). Bill C-13, the
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, however, codifies 10
criminal bans. This paper considers the merits of the
various arguments levied against Bill C-13, and the corollary claim that only a ‘‘non-prohibitive’’ model of legislation befits NRTs and NGTs.

Introducing the Arguments

C

ommentators argue that NRTs and NGTs should
not be regulated, even if only in part, by way of
statutory prohibitions with the force of the criminal law.
In essence, they claim legislation without criminal bans
is better. The Canadian Parliament, however, may not be
persuaded. Bill C-13, the Assisted Human Reproduction
Act, which includes several criminal bans, has already
passed second reading. 1 In this paper, I consider the
merits (and demerits) of all the arguments that have
been levied in protest of Bill C-13’s current form, and the
corollary claim that, taken together, these arguments
favour a ‘‘non-prohibitive’’ or ‘‘regulatory’’ model of legislation for NRTs and NGTs.
It is not my aim to review the extensive legislative
history of Bill C-13, and the variety of initiatives that
preceded the Bill, though the specifics of those initiatives
do factor into the analysis, adding context to the arguments that are identified. In fact, the literature from
which the arguments are abstracted largely predates
Bill C-13, and grew in response to past initiatives. Articles
attacking the provisions of Bill C-13 essentially recycle
many of the same arguments, supporting the contention
that attempts to utilise the criminal law power have
stymied legislative action up to this point. This paper
aims to decipher whether that should be the case; insofar
as the identified arguments can be substantially undermined, the debate needs to take a new direction.
Bill C-13 combines a regulatory scheme with statutory prohibitions. 2 The controversy centres on the 10
prohibited activities, however, listed in section 5 of the
Bill. 3 Only these statutory prohibitions, which attach
maximum penalties of a $500,000 fine and/or 10 years’
imprisonment, 4 have attracted explicit criticism as
‘‘blunt instruments’’ of the criminal law. Yet Bill C-13
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Three types of arguments are used to critique criminal bans:
(1) ‘‘Structural’’ arguments hinge on the constraints of the Canadian legal system — legislation complete with prohibitions runs afoul of
the Constitution Act 1867, violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and
cannot keep pace with scientific progress.
(2) ‘‘Consequentialist’’ arguments focus on the
potential results of enacting a statute carrying
criminal bans — criminalization will chill
research, drive research underground, encourage
researcher forum shopping, fuel public misperception by reinforcing genetic determinism,
and effectively foreclose important dialogue on
NRTs and NGTs.
(3) ‘‘Theoretical’’ arguments relate to the very
nature of criminal law — prohibitions will be
unenforceable; the criminal law, a model of
‘‘command and control’’, will be ineffective in
shaping research practice; and moral ambiguity
can support only regulation, as consensus is a
sine qua none for criminal bans.
All the arguments in opposition to criminal bans
prove unpersuasive; moreover, they fail to substantiate a
non-prohibitive alternative for NRT–NGT regulation.
Bill C-13 should therefore be proclaimed into law; per-
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provides that all other contraventions of the Bill itself, or
regulations made under it, or the terms and conditions
of a licence, are punishable by a maximum fine of
$250,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years. 5 Any
breach of section 5 can attract prosecution as an indictable offence or as a summary conviction offence; the
same applies for a breach of any of the other provisions,
regulations, or licence terms. Commentators have not
always been careful to articulate whether their criticism
of Bill C-13’s use of the criminal law extends beyond
section 5. This suggests that commentators are less concerned about the use of the criminal law in principle,
and more about what precisely is the subject of prohibition.
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Therein lies the superficiality of the present debate.
Critics are, for the most part, squabbling over the alleged
features of the criminal law, as opposed to proffering
why (or why not) they view a particular activity as appropriate for prohibition (or not). In keeping with the literature, I will restrict my focus to section 5 6 and the appropriateness of criminalizing those activities in an effort to
move the debate past this level of superficiality. To avoid
a taxonomy dispute, only the offences created by section 5 of Bill C-13 will be regarded as ‘‘true crimes’’. 7
Furthermore, I do not question whether legislation
(of any kind) is needed. 8 Existing mechanisms such as
self-regulation and established civil and criminal laws
are, in my view, not adequate responses to NRTs and
NGTs. 9 I will also assume that the statutory prohibitions
are drafted with precision sufficient to satisfy the ‘‘principle of legality’’ — the requirement that the law be
knowable in advance. 10
The paper is divided according to argument type. In
my estimation, there are three different types of arguments used to critique criminal bans: ‘‘structural’’ arguments, ‘‘consequentialist’’ arguments, and ‘‘theoretical’’
arguments. Structural arguments hinge on the constraints of the Canadian legal system bearing upon
Bill C-13 — legislation complete with prohibitions
potentially runs afoul of the division of powers set out by
the Constitution Act, 1867 11 and/or violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 12 and legislation
cannot keep pace with scientific progress (it is too difficult to amend). Consequentialist arguments highlight the potential effects of enactinga statute that carries
the force of criminal law — criminalization will chill
research, and/or drive the research underground beyond
regulation, and/or encourage forum shopping, and/or
fuel public misperception by reinforcing genetic determinism, and/or put an end to dialogue. Theoretical
arguments relate to the very nature of criminal law —
these prohibitions will be unenforceable; the criminal
law, a model of ‘‘command and control’’, will be ineffective in shaping research practice; and moral ambiguity
can support only regulation, as consensus is a sine qua
none for criminal bans.
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The paper takes on all these arguments in that
order. Compartmentalizing arguments in this fashion
reveals significant crossover of premises and claims. The
structural argument that criminal bans are inflexible
appears to underpin several other claims, including, for
example, that prohibitive legislation will not be effective
in the NRT–NGT context. Compartmentalization is
thus analytically profitable; if a claim is demonstrably
suspect, the force of a ‘‘new’’ claim, which relies on the
suspect claim, is weakened — reassertion is not persuasive argument.
One claim, however, transcends nearly all the arguments made against the use of prohibitions: legislation,
which codifies a purely regulatory approach, is better
suited for NRTs and NGTs. The arguments against criminal bans are, in opponents’ minds, markedly less problematic when applied to a non-prohibitive scheme. To
assess this corollary claim, it is essential to envisage an
alternate form of Bill C-13 throughout this paper.
Timothy Caulfield sketches the following:
There is an alternate, non-prohibition model that would
allow the federal government to achieve its stated policy
goals and produce a more flexible and effective regulatory
environment.
The federal government could create a regulatory body
empowered to both issue licences for a defined set of activities . . . and produce, modify, and monitor a ‘‘moratorium
list.’’ This list would contain the activities which, at this
time, should not be allowed (e.g., reproductive cloning). One
of the primary advantages of such an approach is that the
list could be amended and interpreted by the regulatory
body instead of by Parliament. In addition, the law could set
out a specific consultation process, thereby facilitating and
promoting an ongoing, interdisciplinary dialogue on these
important issues. By doing so, the regulatory body could
respond to the issues associated with reproductive genetics
in a more precise and flexible manner. 13

Caulfield and other spokespersons for the non-prohibitive alternative are looking primarily at the framework in place in the United Kingdom. The Human
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (the HFEA), created pursuant to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act (the HFE Act) has regulated NRTs for over a
decade and NGTs more recently. 14 This experience
presents a wealth of information, which Canadian legislators should carefully scrutinize. The operation of the
HFEA and the UK legislation is analysed in the context
of several of the arguments below. 15 However, it is worth
noting at the outset that this legislation contains general
prohibitions under threat of criminal sanction. 16
Indeed, Bill C-13 and the HFE Act illustrate the
defects of a prohibitive/non-prohibitive dichotomy.
Various classifications can be devised for the range of
legislative approaches. 17 After due consideration of all the
arguments canvassed in the course of this paper though,
a fair assessment of the two competing legislative models
(prohibitive and non-prohibitive) should emerge.
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Structural Arguments

S

tructural arguments question whether the federal
government can, in the legal abstract, legislate in
respect of NRTs and NGTs. Merely invoking the spectre
of constitutional challenge is a specious argument. If that
were sufficient, Parliament might never enact laws. Still,
because structural arguments have been made on
repeated occasion, in the Canadian context and
abroad, 18 they merit more generous analysis. The arguments in this part, however, depend uniquely on the
Canadian Constitution and law-making processes in Parliament generally.
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The Division of Powers
The division of powers argument, broadly speaking,
is that Bill C-13 is inconsistent with the federal government’s sources of jurisdiction as entrenched in the Constitution Act, 1867.
As a federal state, Canada divides powers or responsibilities between the federal government and the provincial governments. The heads of power for each level
of government are listed in sections 91 and 92 of the
Constitution Act, 1867, respectively. Legislation outside
the authority of the enacting government (contrary to
the division of powers) is ultra vires and therefore of no
force and effect. The division of powers test involves two
steps: first, the primary aim of the legislation — its ‘‘pith
and substance’’ as distinguished from its ‘‘merely incidental effects’’ — is deciphered; second, whether the pith
and substance of the legislation falls within the powers of
the government seeking to enact is determined. 19 To
effectively engage with the arguments against federal legislation affecting NRTs and NGTs, which turn on the
second step of the division of powers test, it is necessary
to characterize the pith and substance of Bill C-13.
Bill C-13 in Pith and Substance
The text itself is the logical starting point. Section 2
of Bill C-13, a statutory declaration, reads as follows:
(2) The Parliament of Canada recognizes and declares that
(a) the health and well-being of children born through
the application of assited human reproductive technologies must be given priority in all decisions
respecting their use;
(b) the benefits of assisted human reproductive technologies and related research for individuals, families and for society in general can be most effectively secured by taking appropriate measures for
the protection and promotion of human health,
safety, dignity and rights in the use of these technologies and in related research;
(c) while all persons are affected by these technologies,
women more than men are directly and significantly affected by their application and the health
and well-being of women must be protected in the
application of these technologies;
(d) the principle of free and informed consent must be
promoted and applied as a fundamental condition
of the use of human reproductive technologies;

(e) persons who seek to undergo assisted reproduction
procedures must not be discriminated against,
including on the basis of their sexual orientation or
marital status;
(f) trade in the reproductive capacities of women and
men and the exploitation of children, women and
men for commercial ends raise health and ethical
concerns that justify their prohibition; and
(g) human individuality and diversity, and the integrity
of the human genome, must be preserved and protected.

This declaration strives to strike a balance: a balance
between the potential benefits that NRTs and NGTs are
thought to hold, and the harms that those technologies
potentially bring to bear. 20 That the legislation may not
be the most effective means of securing this balance or
that the harmfulness of the activities that it prohibits is
subject to question does not detract from its pith and
substance. 21 Bill C-13, unequivocally, is directed at safeguarding the public interest in NRTs and NGTs. The
Bill recognizes that these technologies may deliver tremendous health benefits to Canadians while acknowledging that they bring into play fundamental issues of
morality affecting women and children in particular, but
also humanity as a whole.
The Legislation is Ultra Vires Parliament
NRTs and NGTs are nonetheless nebulous subject
matter. The issue, then, is whether they are amenable to
any of the listed sources of federal jurisdiction. In the
past, the Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies claimed that legislation would be
grounded in several heads of power, including peace,
order, and good government (POGG), the criminal law,
trade and commerce, and the spending power. 22
Martha Jackman posits instead that legislation like
Bill C-13 may be unconstitutional because it is akin to
public health legislation, 23 and ‘‘health’’ is subject matter
that has traditionally been assigned to the provinces. 24
However, a comment by Jennifer Llewellyn, Jocelyn
Downie, and Robert Holmes, in relation to research
involving humans (RIH), which applies equally to NRTs
and NGTs, is apposite in effectively answering this objection:
It is important to recognize . . . the opening words of s. 92
‘‘[i]n each province’’ as a limitation to the scope of provincial
jurisdiction . . . The limit is intended not only to protect
against provincial intrusion into the federal sphere of
authority, but also to ensure one province cannot trench on
the powers of another province . . . This may pose significant
difficulties in the context of RIH given the extent to which
research projects are integrated and carried out simultaneously in different locations in different provinces. It is generally necessary for research protocols to be consistent in all
locations and thus the regulations of one province are
bound to have effects on the conduct of researchers engaged
in the same project in other provinces. Further, even in cases
where the research is located within the boundaries of a
single province, the results and effects of the research are
not. The products of such research will reach those beyond
the territory or province. 25 [footnote omitted]
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Laws targeting public health issues have, moreover,
been upheld as valid exercises of federal jurisdiction, 26
but not on the basis of the POGG power. 27 Rather, such
legislation is constitutionally sound if tied to the criminal law power. The federal government has made this
link express, stating in May 2001 that, ‘‘[t]he draft legislation is founded upon federal responsibility for criminal
law, as is other health protection legislation such as the
Food and Drugs Act and the Tobacco Act.’’ 28 That the
Bill is decidedly about morality, a purpose central to
criminal law, 29 is plain from the statutory declaration
and also the very nature of NRTs and NGTs:
In much the same way as the courts have found that only
Parliament has the jurisdiction to criminalize (or conversely,
decriminalize) abortion, similar authority would exist it
seems for the criminalization of such controversial practices
as cloning, the creation of human/animal hybrids, use of
fetal tissue and stem cells, etc. 30 [footnote omitted]
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Thus Parliament can enact Bill C-13 as it presently
stands pursuant to subsection 91(27) of the Constitution
Act, 1867, jurisdiction over the criminal law. 31
Parliament Cannot Enact a Regulatory Regime
Jackman, as well as Allison Harvison Young and
Angela Wasunna, alternatively suggest that predominantly regulatory legislation escapes federal authority. 32
While Bill C-13 is referred to as prohibitive throughout
this paper, it potentially fits this description. 33 Nevertheless, as Llewellyn, Downie, and Holmes persuasively
explain, recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence
gives ample scope to use the criminal law power to
deploy a complex regulatory scheme. 34
There are some limits on this deference, however,
and one in particular is germane in view of the nonprohibitive alternative described above. Caulfield advocates for a ‘‘moratorium list’’ of proscribed activities, as
opposed to full-fledged criminal bans, which could be
modified by a regulatory body. In a recent decision, the
Supreme Court held that a regulatory body that has the
authority to ‘‘define offences’’ is outside the proper exercise of the criminal law power. 35 This significantly
undermines the claim that a non-prohibitive approach is
optimal, from a division of powers perspective.

The Charter
The other line of attack under the Constitution
relies on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(the Charter). If any of the statutory prohibitions in the
Bill are found to contradict the rights and freedoms
proscribed by the Charter, then that prohibition may be
declared of no force or effect. In theory, the proposed Act
in its entirety could be struck down. 36 If, however, there
is only a chance of conflict with constitutionalized rights
and freedoms, legislation respecting NRTs and NGTs
should not be forestalled. Ban opponents advance two
possible Charter infringements: infringement of freedom
of expression and infringement of the right to liberty,
contrary to paragraph 2(b) and section 7, respectively.

Canadian Journal of Law and Technology

Banning Cloning Violates Freedom of Expression
Barbara Billingsley argues that the prohibition on
cloning, which encompasses both so-called ‘‘reproductive’’ and ‘‘therapeutic’’ cloning, 37 potentially violates the
freedom of expression guarantee. 38 She concludes that,
‘‘the question of whether the [cloning ban] unjustifiably
violates s. 2(b) of the Charter is a very good question
indeed’’ because the answer is ‘‘complex and not easily
determined’’. 39 For the following reasons, I disagree.
To qualify as expression for the purposes of paragraph 2( b ), the alleged expression has to convey
meaning. 40 Billingsley anticipates the argument that ‘‘the
physical procedure itself does not communicate a message’’, and the related claim that the ban does not prohibit research writ large, but rather ‘‘only one element of
research’’. 41 In response, she offers a different view of
research: therapeutic cloning, or the conduct of an experiment involving therapeutic cloning, conveys meaning
inasmuch as it is viewed as part of a scientific process,
emanating from a scientific hypothesis, in which the act
of choosing to do one experiment over others is reflective (or communicative) of that hypothesis. This process
— generation of a hypothesis followed by experimentation to test that hypothesis — she argues, conveys
meaning ‘‘regardless of whether the experiment’s results
are recorded or disseminated’’. 42
The difficulty with her reasoning is that it assumes
that the hypothesis underlying an experiment is discernable from the choice of experiment. But the exact experiment could be performed to test the hypothesis ‘‘X’’ (e.g.,
cell growth) and ‘‘not X’’ (e.g., no cell growth). If cell
growth results, the experiment provides support for the
hypothesis ‘‘X’’. If cell growth does not result, the experiment provides support for the hypothesis ‘‘not X’’.
Because the hypothesis cannot be deciphered when only
the experimental procedure is known, the meaning of
the experiment is lost. In terms of paragraph 2(b) of the
Charter, the conduct of an experiment by itself is not
communicative when, by definition, the experiment’s
hypothesis could either be ‘‘X’’ or ‘‘not X’’.
Billingsley does, to a limited extent, recognize that
the meaning of an experiment may be plural:
a scientist [who] decides to test his or her hypothesis about
cell growth by using only certain types of cells . . . may be
conveying the message that the hypothesis is applicable only
to certain cells, that the use of other cells is unethical or
immoral, or that the hypothesis is most easily demonstrated
by the selected cell group. 43

However, these various possible implications all
follow from a prior understanding of the cell growth
hypothesis, which is not self-evident from the experimental procedure. Thus the objection Billingsley anticipates — the conduct of the experiment itself is non-communicative — is not answered.
Alternatively, Billingsley suggests that even if the
conduct of this research lacks meaning, it is logically
inseparable from recording and disseminating the results
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of that research. 44 However, it is logically possible to
conduct the experiment without recording or disseminating any results. Of course a scientist could attempt to
clone a human being without writing anything down.
Thus, while the recording and dissemination may be
expression, the cloning itself is not.
Billingsley’s arguments in support of the claim that
the act of experimentation itself qualifies as expression
protected by paragraph 2(b) are unconvincing; as such
her section 1 Charter analysis does not merit further
discussion.

Banning Cloning Violates Liberty of the Person
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Another possible argument against Bill C-13 is that
prohibiting reproductive cloning violates the right to liberty of the person because it is a denial of ‘‘procreative
liberty’’. To date this argument has not surfaced in the
Canadian debate. 45 Notable American commentators,
including John Robertson and Ronald Dworkin, have
put forth this claim in relation to the American Constitution, however, so it is worthy of brief consideration in
light of Canadian jurisprudence. 46
The liberty interest enshrined by section 7 of the
Charter is ‘‘engaged where state compulsions or prohibitions affect important and fundamental life choices’’ (i.e.,
it protects individuals’ personal autonomy). 47 However,
such ‘‘autonomy is not synonymous with unconstrained
freedom’’. 48 To attract section 7 protection, it appears
that paramount importance would have to be placed on
an individual’s desire to have a genetically related child.
But this borders on the absurd:
It cannot be just the genetic tie that is important in human
reproduction, because if it were, this could be accomplished
by having one’s twin brother have a child with one’s wife —
the genetic tie would be identical, yet few, if any, would
argue that this method of reproduction should satisfy the
twin’s right to have a ‘‘genetically-related child.’’ 49 [footnote
omitted]

There are strong countervailing concerns (e.g., harm
to the resulting cloned child and breaches of the child’s
section 7 rights), which many argue demand this limit
on reproductive freedom, if it can even be termed reproduction. 50 Thus a ban on reproductive cloning constitutes a perfectly legitimate constraint on individual liberty and is in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice; that a court in Canada might
decide otherwise appears unimaginable at this stage. 51
The paragraph 2(b) and section 7 Charter arguments against Bill C-13, specifically the prohibition on
cloning delineated in paragraph 5(1)(a) of the Bill, are
spurious. Indirect support for a non-prohibitive piece of
legislation is therefore wanting. A latent concern about
the flexibility of statutory bans as compared to regulations seems to underlie Billingsley’s analysis; 52 this structural argument is dealt with next.

Law-Making Processes
Commentators have questioned the appropriateness
of statutory prohibitions because legislation, allegedly,
takes too long to enact or amend, whereas regulations
can be issued more rapidly. This poor timeliness is seen
as particularly problematic in the area of NRTs and
NGTs because it is ‘‘characterised by rapid scientific and
clinical developments’’. 53 I will consider these two
related criticisms claims in succession.

Legislation is More Difficult To Amend or Enact
Than Regulations
It has already been pointed out that legislation can
in theory be enacted in as few as 24 days in Canada, 54
while Bill C-13 establishes a regulation-enacting procedure that can require 60 days. 55 Caulfield, one of the
primary advocates of the timeliness claim, concedes the
fact but cautions that swift Parliamentary action is exceptional, maintaining that, ‘‘the pace at which Parliament
typically moves to enact or amend legislation [contrasts
readily with] the flexibility and responsiveness that
would characterize a regulatory body.’’ 56 This claim is
based on a misperception of the speed of regulatory
action. More importantly, his rebuttal misses the point: it
is all about political will. Parliament acts quickly when it
wishes to do so. The form of law — legislation versus
regulation — is not controlling. The amendments to the
statutes governing remuneration of members of the
House of Commons and Senate provide an all too perfect example. Bill C-28, as it was called, was introduced
on June 4, 2001, and received Royal Assent only 10 days
later. 57 In sharp contrast, efforts to revamp Canada’s
blood safety system by the enactment of new regulations
under the Food and Drugs Act have been underway for
an extended period. Health Canada expects the new
regulations, which are to be based upon ‘‘safety standards’’ first drafted in 1997 but still under development,
to be fully implemented sometime in 2005. 58
Recent experience in the UK is also significant in
this regard. In response to a judgment issued by the High
Court, which excepted embryos created by somatic cell
nuclear transfer from the purview of the HFE Act, 59 Parliament passed the Human Reproductive Cloning Act
2001. 60 The judgment was dated November 15, 2001,
and the statute was given Royal Assent on December 4,
2001. Though the decision was later overturned at the
Court of Appeal, 61 the UK Parliament did not delay, for
fear that someone might create a human clone. By contrast, while many commentators have applauded the
UK’s model of regulation for its adaptability and (primarily) non-prohibitive approach, it does not follow that
such a model is necessarily more streamlined. The HFEA
has not acted on a research licence application filed by
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the Roslin Institute to do therapeutic cloning, one way
or the other, for more than a year. 62
Statutory Prohibitions Cannot Keep Pace With
Scientific Change
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The argument that criminal bans are more cumbersome than regulations affecting the instant technologies
is further weakened by observing that the rate of scientific change is not as rapid as it often appears. There is
supposedly a race amongst the ‘mad scientists’ and
groups like the Raelians to be the first to clone a human
being. Assuming that cloning a human was not considered undesirable, current best estimates place safe
cloning of human beings (i.e., reproductive cloning) a
hundred years away. 63 If the ‘‘other’’ kind of cloning
dubbed therapeutic cloning, based on the very same
scientific technique, takes even one-tenth the time to
become safe, an existing ban could be repealed or modified 56 times over. 64
According to Dorothy Wertz, Marie-H él ène
Régnier, and Bartha Knoppers, time is not enough. They
write, ‘‘[t]oday’s laws become tomorrow’s embarrassments when new technologies appear’’, citing Germany,
Sweden, and Denmark as examples of jurisdictions
where destructive embryo research is criminalized. 65
Wertz et al. assume that because the onset of embryonic
stem cell research has engendered political debate in
those countries over pre-existing laws, and the laws have
not been repealed or modified as a result of those
debates, the laws have proven ‘‘impossible to change’’.
This ignores the possibility that the deliberating
governments decided that it was not preferable to alter
those laws. 66 Consider the German experience. The
German Embryo Protection Act, which prohibits the
destruction of embryos for any purpose, came into force
in 1991. 67 Following the now-infamous 1998 experiments reporting on the therapeutic potential of embryonic stem cells, German researchers found a legal loophole and argued that importing stem cells derived
abroad does not contravene the law. 68 The central public
funding organization for academic research in Germany
(the DFG) published a press release affirming this
opinion in March 1999. 69 The Study Commission on
Law and Ethics in Modern Medicine, and the German
National Ethics Council (GNEC), both created by Parliament, issued separate reports on 12 November 2001, and
20 December 2001, respectively. Members in each were
deeply divided, with the majorities reaching opposing
conclusions. 70
Yet the ultimate decision incorporated aspects from
both bodies:
On 30 January 2002, the German Parliament voted with a
large majority to uphold embryo protection, emphasizing
the strict prohibition of any research on embryos that leads
to embryo destruction. It voted for prohibiting, in principle,
the import of ES cells and, at the same time, decided that a
law should be passed to establish criteria for the exceptional
import and use of ES cells in Germany. . .The Stem Cell Law
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was passed on 25 April 2002 and came into force on 1 July
2002. 71

Thus in Germany the laws were not impossible to
change per se; rather, the government chose not to
change them in the direction that Wertz et al. appear to
have desired. The debate did take time, but far from
being counterproductive. It is also critical to note that
the DFG, the research funding body, was paralysed
during all this notwithstanding the fact that it did not
consider stem cell imports to be illegal. The DFG
received an application to do such research in the
summer of 2000, but it withheld approval until the day
after Parliament voted in January 2002; the funds were
frozen until the new law came into being seven months
later. 72
Scientific advance is likely to test the scope and
precision of laws. However, it does not follow that regulatory bodies will feel empowered with sufficient
authority to make controversial decisions, absent specific
guidance from government. This belies any claim that
non-prohibitive legislation dependent on the promulgation of regulations by a regulatory body can respond to
scientific development more swiftly than Parliament. 73

Consequentialist Arguments

T

his category of argument speaks to the potential
consequences of enacting a statute that includes
statutory prohibitions backed by criminal sanction.
Critics of Bill C-13 and other proposals claim that negative consequences will ensue if legislation with prohibitions is passed. I consider five overlapping arguments in
this part of the paper.

Chilling Research
It is argued that if prohibitions are proclaimed in
force, scientists will not undertake ‘‘valuable’’ research. It
is also argued that the stigma associated with the commission of a crime, or the perception thereof, is bound to
compromise the research agenda. Scientists, inhibited by
the threat of criminal sanction, will avoid any activity
remotely resembling conduct that is prohibited. 74 The
intent of scientists will have to be policed from inside
the laboratory walls, adversely impacting the research
environment. 75 Still, these are all ‘‘chilling effect’’ arguments that either lack empirical support or are countermanded by the provisions of Bill C-13, which I illustrate
starting with the last:
Bans Will Require Excessive Policing of Scientific
Intent
Bill C-13 establishes an inspection and enforcement
regime. Inspectors are given broad powers 76 and there
are some positive duties placed upon the owner-operators of research facilities to facilitate inspection. 77 However, inspectors may not simply enter research facilities at
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will; they must reasonably believe that a ‘‘controlled
activity is undertaken or that there is any material or
information in respect of which this Act applies or any
information pertaining to a controlled activity’’. 78 If the
location is a dwelling house, then a warrant must first be
obtained, 79 and the inspectors’ expertise 80 should allay
researchers’ fears of false criminal allegations for lawful
activity.
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Bans Will Cause Lawful Research to be Avoided
The suggestion that scientists are likely to avoid an
activity because it might be seen to remotely resemble
prohibited conduct is curious, given that expert inspectors should be able to keenly distinguish between prohibited and non-prohibited forms of research. Unless the
prohibitions are vague 81 or otherwise imprecise, then
this is unpersuasive. For the purposes of this paper, however, I have assumed that vagueness is not a problem.
(Definitional problems will hopefully be remedied prior
to Bill C-13 passing.) Sticking to that assumption then,
prohibitions may actually encourage researchers. At the
moment, scientists in Canada express hesitation over
proceeding in a vacuum; unequivocal rules may actually
be less chilling than the status quo. 82
Bans Will Force Researchers to Forego Valuable
Research
First, it is not known that any of the research activities prohibited by section 5 of the Bill will prove valuable. Proponents of this chilling effect argument are
likely to respond that this is why the research must
proceed. But is this in fact the underlying concern? Are
critics motivated by a concern about lost therapeutic
value or some other value (e.g., economic value)? And are
such other ends equally worthy of pursuit? Or is a technological imperative — the idea that if something can be
done it will be done, and even should be done —
behind the rhetoric of scientific inquiry?
Cutting off an avenue of research, temporarily,
might actually exert a positive effect. For example, the
research agenda presently appears skewed in favour of
embryonic stem cells, while studies evidencing greater
pluripotency in stem cells derived from adult tissues
than previously thought continue to appear. 83
Finally, additional risks attendant upon prohibited
research activities countermand the relative value of
those activities to some extent. Cloning to produce stem
cells, for instance, poses an increased possibility of infinite cell growth and tumour formation. 84 Moreover,
scientists are only beginning to identify the effects of
cloning processes on the resultant organisms; one recent
survey revealed a previously unrecognized pattern of
defects in cloned animals. 85

Encouraging Forum Shopping
Commentators suggest scientists will leave the jurisdiction to pursue prohibited research in a foreign juris-

diction where it is not banned: ‘‘It will force U.S. scientists who have private funding to stop their research, and
it will accelerate the brain drain to more enlightened
countries.’’ 86 Those who are against including statutory
prohibitions in Canadian legislation, posit the same. 87
Researchers Will Leave Canada
Researchers are certainly apt to move around.
When the American President announced that research
with stem cell lines derived after 9 August 2001, would
be ineligible for federal funding, one leading scientist
moved to the United Kingdom. 88 Researchers have also
been drawn to Israel and Singapore, for their supposedly
lax regulatory constraints, the lack of political controversy, and commercial ventures. 89
But to the extent that researcher movement has
increased of late, the contention that it is motivated by
anxiety or disdain for criminal prohibitions does not
automatically follow. Jose Cibelli, for example, one of the
first researchers to ever undertake somatic cell nuclear
transfer experiments with human embryos while
working for a private company in the U.S., 90 recently
resigned that position, accepting an offer from Michigan
State University. In the state of Michigan, all cloning is
criminally banned. 91 Furthermore, because of the paucity of viable stem cells, there is an international eagerness to collaborate, 92 notwithstanding the diversity of
legal approaches to this research.
Cutting-Edge Research Will Not Be Performed in
Canada
It remains possible that some researchers will leave
Canada to pursue research projects that are banned by
Bill C-13. Banning select research activities, opponents
argue, therefore ‘‘assumes that cutting-edge research will
be done elsewhere’’. 93
This proposition, however, presumes that such ‘‘cutting-edge’’ research is worthy of pursuit. While scientists
frequently take the position that a scientific problem
should be approached with many different methodologies, they do not necessarily advocate for utilizing every
conceivable technology. For example, Janet Rossant, one
of Canada’s leading stem cell researchers, has expressed
hesitation over undertaking chimera research, even
though it may be the ‘‘gold standard’’ for testing the
pluripotency of stem cells. 94 Reports of an American fertility specialist’s work creating ‘‘she-male’’ chimeric
embryos have been condemned internationally for want
of scientific utility, 95 though the she-male embryos are
nonetheless the products of cutting-edge research.
Whether the prohibited NRTs or NGTs, the creation of chimeras included, will prove harmful (in any
sense) remains to be seen. There is evidence and opinion
supporting both promise and peril. If the argument from
critics really is that a particular technology is more beneficial on balance, then they should make that argument
beyond simply labelling it cutting-edge. Even so, Parlia-

158
ment’s jurisdiction to enact criminal prohibitions is not
at all dependent on causal evidence of harm. 96

Driving Research Underground
Young and Wasunna claim, in relation to the
prohibitions on commercial surrogacy and ovum donation, 97 that criminal bans may force activities ‘‘underground’’. 98 The Young and Wasunna argument is also
applicable to the section 5 activities: if bans are enacted,
researchers will nonetheless research the prohibited technologies underground, resulting in harmful consequences. 99 Young and Wasunna explain, analogizing to
abortion:
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Prohibitions against abortion merely stopped the practice
by those physicians who did not want to break the law. In
other words, one might argue that it stopped the ‘‘best’’ of
the abortion practitioners. In driving the practice underground, the legislation masked the existence and stifled the
outcry that might have resulted if the real horror and costs
had been known. The big losers were the women, and
generally less affluent women, who were forced to go underground and were powerless and vulnerable in the event that
they were mistreated, overcharged or butchered. 100

There are analogous demands that could fuel
underground research of the section 5 activities, which
might carry similar adverse outcomes. For example, the
Bill only permits embryos remaining from assisted
human reproduction endeavours (i.e., ‘‘spare embryos’’)
to be utilized in research. There is a prohibition on the
creation of embryos solely for research purposes
(i.e.,‘‘research embryos’’). 101 Françoise Baylis has noted
that Canada is probably in short supply of spare
embryos; 102 therefore, researchers might decide to
secretly contravene the research embryo creation ban to
keep embryos in supply. Such underground research is
likely to engender abuses insofar as there are fewer
incentives to obey the requirements of consent and noncommercialization set out elsewhere in the Bill when the
activity is not licensable in the first instance.
Furthermore, research is already occurring underground in the absence of legislation. Experiments
breaching existing research guidelines have apparently
become somewhat commonplace in Canada. The Raelians’ efforts to clone a human are well publicized, but
aptly described as ‘‘renegade’’. 103 To suggest that prohibitions on chimera-making and cloning 104 would increase
the number of such unsupervised projects lacks any evidentiary basis. Bill C-13 is importantly unlike the abortion prohibition in that it creates an inspection and
enforcement regime that serves to guard against potentially harmful practices. Accepting that there is no reason
to believe that regulatory offences will prove easier to
enforce than criminal bans, 105 the claim that criminal
bans will lead to increased underground research is suspect at best. Given that underground abuses are inimical
to the stated objects of Bill C-13, it is fair to assume
considerable effort will be expended to target research
practices in violation of the law.
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Fuelling Public Misperception
Caulfield is the chief proponent of this argument:
[G]overnments should not jump to pass anti-cloning laws,
particularly criminal laws, until they have clear and consistent justifications for a long-term ban. The use of rigid prohibitive legislation has the potential to do little more than
formally legitimize inaccurate notions of genetic determinism. 106

I completely agree with two points that Caulfield
makes — that justifications for bans need to be adequately articulated, and that the public needs to be
engaged and informed. Yet I fail to see how these claims
decidedly favour a non-prohibitive approach.
Eric Juengst criticizes George Annas’s proposed
treaty to ban ‘‘crimes against humanity’’ such as cloning
and germ-line genetic alteration, 107 largely because the
treaty ignores what Juengst describes as a more pressing
concern — intolerance for genetic diversity. 108 This
approximates Caulfield’s concerns surrounding genetic
determinism. As Juengst admits, however, the connection between banning a certain activity and fortifying a
mistaken view is tenuous. For example, it is possible to
suggest that laws prohibiting human or civil rights violations reinforce rather than undermine discriminatory
attitudes. This is an empirical claim, to which there is no
answer; codifying those prohibitions into law was
arguably worth doing in any event. 109
Of course the issue of genetic determinism is open
to debate. Whereas Caulfield predicts that by using
prohibitions Bill C-13 will exacerbate these mistaken
views, 110 in direct contrast, Lori Andrews and Nanette
Elster invoke genetic determinism as a primary justification for banning cloning. 111 ‘‘Banning cloning would be
in keeping with philosopher Joel Feinberg’s analysis that
children have a right to an ‘open future’. . . The risk here
is of hubris, of abuse of power.’’ 112 This type of philosophical engagement with the prohibited activities is
currently absent in the context of Bill C-13, however. 113
Thus, speculation one way or the other is not persuasive
for the issue of inclusion or exclusion of criminal bans.
Greater articulation of the reasoning behind the
prohibitions from Parliament, similar to more meaningful argument about NRTs and NGTs from commentators, is welcome. 114 Other sections of the Bill, including
the part setting out the ‘‘controlled activities’’, might benefit from further explanation as well. Intensifying public
misperceptions is therefore not an argument against
bans so much as a call for a commitment to enabling
civic republicanism to counteract misperceptions. That
commitment is what Annas’s proposed treaty fails to
pledge. In my view, legislation can combine statutory
prohibitions with an aim to engage citizens. The final
consequentialist argument considers whether criminal
bans effectively foreclose that project.
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Closing Off a Dialogue
LeRoy Walters claims that ‘‘a federal ban at this
time would be premature: It would, in effect, announce a
conclusion to a national and international ethical debate
that is still ongoing.’’ 115 Similarly, Susan Wolf comments
that a ban ‘‘ends the important deliberation, embraces
one absolutist moral perspective, and writes it into
law.’’ 116 In the Canadian context, Young and Wasunna
argue that a ‘‘creatively designed regulatory framework
. . . would have the added benefit of being more accessible and democratic through open and continuing discourse with all stakeholders.’’ 117 Similarly, Caulfield distinguishes: ‘‘The public message of a well-structured
regulatory scheme should be that open, vibrant and continued dialogue is encouraged. The message of statutory
bans is that public debate is closed.’’ 118
This is an important objection, because if the
impetus for the legislation is to secure the benefits of
NRTs and NGTs for citizens, while safeguarding them
from potential harms, Parliament cannot afford to
alienate citizens in the process of discovering and deliberating about what those benefits and harms are. 119 The
effect of announcing a conclusion, as Walters puts it, is
premised on either the idea that prohibitions are effectively carved in stone or that prohibitions impede consensus-seeking or deliberation altogether. The former
premise, as shown above, is incorrect — finality is not
inherent in a prohibition. With respect to the latter, two
closely related claims bear examination: prohibitions
limit debate, and a non-prohibitive legislative approach
is more democratic.
Statutory Prohibitions Limit Dialogue
There are three counterarguments to this claim,
each calling into question whether the existence of statutory prohibitions is in fact likely to inhibit discussion.
First, entire pieces of legislation or changes to a law in
force can be proposed at any time by way of private
members’ Bills. (Many of the Bills proposing bans on
cloning — some total and some prohibiting only reproductive cloning — in the United States Congress have
been private members’ Bills. 120) This mechanism exists
for members of the House of Commons to initiate
debate in Parliament, and prohibitions provide fertile
grounds for such action.
Second, irrespective of whether the private Bill
mechanism is exercised, the federal government has
promised to revisit the provisions of Bill C-13 and the
administration of the statute as a whole within three
years from the date it is proclaimed in force. 121 This
signals a commitment to ongoing debate and consultation.
Third, international experience reveals that bans
have fuelled discussion as opposed to exerting a silencing
effect. The German example is once more apposite. In
the wake of the experiments detailing the tremendous
therapeutic potential of embryonic stem cells, the gov-

ernmental research funding body released two separate
opinions, and two separate committees were struck by
Parliament to study and report on the ethical and legal
issues, all of which energized debates in the German
Parliament ultimately culminating in a Parliamentary
vote. All this debate and discussion was made necessary
by the Embryo Protection Act, which prohibits destructive embryo research. Perhaps discussion would not have
occurred at all or to the same extent without that particular law in place. Certainly, the ban did not quell debate.

A Regulatory Approach Is More Democratic
Caulfield spins the argument about the speed of
legislative amendment — ‘‘Parliament is fast enough ’’ —
to move to the issue of democratic accountability, 122 and
to help make the claim that a non-prohibitive approach
is more democratic because it does not send the message
that the debate is over. That is, no matter whether the
debate is in fact closed, it will be perceived as being
closed.
Assessing this objection necessitates an inquiry into
the regulatory decision-making mechanisms contemplated by Bill C-13. Section 21 of the Bill establishes the
Assisted Human Reproduction Agency of Canada (the
‘‘Agency’’). Representation of laypersons on the Agency is
not statutorily required, and there is no mandatory duty
to consult the public. 123 Does this convey a strong message of support for open discourse? Moreover, the Bill
requires that regulations made under the proposed Act
be laid before the House of Commons, except in certain
circumstances, 124 evidencing recognition of the special
significance of democratic accountability in the
NRT–NGT context. Only Parliamentary debate can
claim legitimacy as representative of the views of
Canadians. No such requirement of Parliamentary scrutiny exists in relation to research licences granted by the
Agency.
The UK approach is instructive in this regard as
well. Lee and Morgan explain:
In keeping with the generally flexible framework of the
legislation, there are enabling provisions under s. 45 for the
Secretary of State to make changes by way of regulations.
However, some provisions of the Act are so fundamental to
the integrity of the scheme agreed on that they may not be
changed without Parliamentary scrutiny . . . Section 45(4)
provides that the Secretary of State may not make regulations which would permit the hitherto prohibited keeping
or use of an embryo (under s. 3(3)(c)) without the opportunity for full Parliamentary consideration secured by the
affirmative resolution procedure. A similar reservation is
made in respect of any proposal to relax regulations prohibiting the storage or use of gametes (s. 4(2)) or any changes
proposed under sch. 2, para. 1(1)(g) or (4). These last provisions concern, respectively, the practices which may be
authorised in a treatment licence and a condition in a
research licence which authorises the alteration of the
genetic structure of an embryo cell. If any amendment is
proposed to either of these provisions it must be the subject
of affirmative Parliamentary scrutiny. 125
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The HFE Act does allow for amendment of prohibitions by regulation, but only after debate by elected
representatives. The legislation thus underscores the
importance of democratic accountability when the ‘‘provisions . . . are so fundamental to the integrity of the
scheme’’. 126 In other words, the means by which amendment is initiated, by Parliament itself or the regulatory
body, is not all-important. However, the forum where
such a key decision is made is. And the presence of
statutory bans ensures that Parliament is the decisionmaking forum.
Debates among members of the Agency (the Canadian analogue of the HFEA) about which research
projects to license and not to license, carry no guarantee
of civic participation nor even public knowledge of those
debates. If all the activities that are presently prohibited
were instead listed as controlled activities, citizens might
interpret a wholly different message than support of
open dialogue, one that does not comport with the pith
and substance of Bill C-13:
When a scientific activity has the potential to devalue
human life and undermine the principles of human equality
and dignity, that activity deserves to be met with a powerful
and meaningful response . . . Legislation based on a regulatory framework would not provide such a response . . . The
baseline assumption would be that the activities in question
are acceptable. A regulatory approach therefore fails to capture and communicate the importance that should be
attached to the values of human life and dignity. 127

In short, the basis for the claim that legislation,
wholly regulatory in character, is somehow more amenable to continued discourse or is more consistent with
democracy, is very thin. Moreover, such an approach
may dilute the significance of the issues (moral, health,
safety) relating to NRTs and NGTs. The interpretation of
the message conveyed by a non-prohibitive statute
crosses over into criminal law theory, which comprises
the third and final category of argument against Bill
C-13’s inclusion of bans.

Theoretical Arguments

T

he arguments in this section trade on the nature of
the criminal law, its proper ambit and its limitations. From enforcement to efficacy, two obviously
linked concerns, and then to the claim invoking moral
ambiguity, these arguments increasingly depend on theoretical cogency.

Enforcement
The Bill devotes an entire part to ‘‘Inspection and
Enforcement’’, detailing who can be appointed as inspectors, their tenure, powers, and functions. 128 The Bill provides that inspectors should possess expertise specific to
the NRT–NGT context. 129 Young and Wasunna nevertheless take the view that the activities banned are distinguishable (in terms of enforcement) from ‘‘more typical
violations of the criminal law, such as assault, robbery or
break and enter.’’ 130 The intent of scientists will be diffi-
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cult to monitor, therefore, enforcement will be a
problem. 131 Furthermore, they claim it is not plain what
the appropriate burden of proof is for these novel
crimes. 132
As to the burden of proof, this issue is by no means
unique to these prohibitions. Sexual assault, ostensibly
one of the ‘‘typical’’ crimes cited by Young and
Wasunna, is a prime example. 133 To the extent that prohibited research activities do go underground, they
become more akin to typical crime. The issue of deciphering intent arises because the prohibitions might be
fraught with ambiguity. 134 However, that goes to the
precision of the prohibition as drafted, not to the use of
the prohibition in principle.
The primary difficulty with this line of argument,
though, is that it offers no support for the corollary claim
favouring a non-prohibitive approach. Young and
Wasunna argue that the ‘‘subsequent enforcement of law
depends on a certain level of commitment to the goals’’
of the legislation. 135 Commitment is necessary to enforce
prohibitions; equally, commitment is needed to enforce
a regulatory scheme. Even conceding that NRTs and
NGTs are qualitatively different than all other crimes, it
does not follow that enforcement of conditions of a
research licence will be any easier. 136 A non-prohibitive
jurisdiction does not escape enforcement issues. 137 In
terms of infrastructure, the UK’s HFEA employs parttime inspectors and ‘‘there is clear evidence that inspections have been inconsistent from the inception of the
HFEA’’ because many of the inspectors have significant
ties to the field. 138 Thus legislation that is exclusively
regulatory runs the risk of instilling a false sense of public
confidence in the system, 139 giving an inaccurate perception that the scheme, as a whole, works.

Efficacy
The efficacy argument is that the prohibitive model
of regulating NRTs and NGTs will not work. This claim
may arise in two distinct guises: the first recycles the
flawed ‘‘legislation cannot keep pace with the science’’
argument, and the second characterises the criminal law
as a model of coercion, of ‘‘command and control’’. 140
Scientific Change Undermines the Efficacy of the
Legislation
The political will counterargument still applies, but
it is useful to recount in greater detail an example
described above that is directly on point. The example
reinforces the view that when the science surpasses a
law’s plain wording, the scheme is not rendered defunct.
The HFE Act prohibits granting research licences
that authorize ‘‘replacing a nucleus of a cell of an embryo
with a nucleus taken from a cell of any person, embryo
or subsequent development of an embryo’’. 141 However,
the so-called ‘‘Dolly technique’’ made it possible, in
theory, to make a human clone without breaching the
statute. In fact, such an experiment is possibly not even
within the jurisdiction of the HFEA. 142 The Dolly
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procedure for cloning appears to fall outside the relevant
prohibition because it requires the nucleus to be introduced into an enucleated ovum, not an embryo. Thus
the procedure was not, literally speaking, within the
ambit of the statute. Lee and Morgan describe the perceived impact of this scientific development:
The ‘‘Dolly technique’’ not only stormed the popular imagination and gave the Boys from Brazil their greatest exercise
in the last 15 years, it again appeared to shake the foundations on which the 1990 Act had been built; the scientific
rocks on which the legislative house had laid its foundations
were being battered by the waves of scientific endeavour
and coming increasingly to resemble the shifting of sands
on which public policy’s slippery slopes have their first
outing: law was surfing again the turbulent seas of chaos
theory. 143
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The Pro-Life Alliance subsequently brought a challenge to the UK High Court, contending that the HFE
Act does not catch the entity created by the Dolly procedure. 144 The Court agreed, but the decision was later
overturned. 145 The UK Parliament intervened in the
interim, however, enacting legislation to extend the
scope of the prohibition. 146 The integrity of the scheme
was not surrendered by a dated prohibition. 147
Coercive Legislation is Counterproductive
A second version of the efficacy argument identifies
the criminal law as a model of ‘‘command and control’’,
and as such liable to ‘‘being co-opted by dominant social
forces in ways that can often undermine the very initiatives which led to its creation’’. 148 For example, Bill
C-13’s prohibition of germ-line genetic alteration 149 is
possibly intended to respond to fears that such interventions could cultivate a demand for ‘‘designer babies’’,
which one day could give rise to a state of affairs where
parents who possess the requisite means actively seek to
enhance their genetic endowment, creating two classes,
the ‘‘GenRich’’ and ‘‘the naturals’’. 150 Nevertheless, the
same evil targeted — genetic determinism — may be
encouraged, it is thought, by criminalizing those classes
of interventions. 151 The same objection might be levied
against human rights codes, however, which have so far
failed to eradicate prejudicial and misinformed attitudes.
But prohibiting discrimination is still laudable. Provided
at least that legislators and, in turn, regulators endeavour
to consult and involve the citizenry, the risk posed by
dominant social force with respect to NRTs and NGTs
should be continuously guarded against.
A second tack against this command-control claim
is to ask, ‘‘What is the appropriate measure of efficacy?’’ It
is generally unclear whether the host of behaviours
addressed by the Criminal Code are effectively suppressed or simply managed by the fact of criminalization.
Thus the claim that a command-control approach is
ineffective in preventing certain activities is not restricted
to the activities listed in the Bill, nor a function of some
quality that the NRTs and NGTs share. Similarly, it is
difficult to decipher whether a regulatory body is succeeding in the execution of its oversight responsibilities. 152 Not fitting a command-control description does
not make efficacy any less important, however.

Thirdly, the sufficiency of this command-control
characterization of the criminal law is subject to challenge. Certainly, criminal prohibitions aim to shape
behaviour, penalizing breaches of the standards they set
out. Yet the criminal law is not frozen either in terms of
the subject matter to which it can be appropriately
applied or in terms of the various forms by which it
could be implemented. 153 In theory, there is potential
scope for crafting prohibitions backed by criminal penalties to reflect specifics of the subject matter targeted by
Bill C-13. The final argument in the paper questions
whether an alleged characteristic of NRTs and NGTs —
moral ambiguity — eliminates any such scope.

Moral Ambiguity
The claim here is: ‘‘The public tends to demand
prohibition of conduct that is universally opposed, but
expects issues of moral ambiguity to be regulated.’’ 154
Regardless of the authority of this proposition, it is critical because it requires exclusion of NRTs and NGTs
from the proper ambit of the criminal law by definition;
it does not purport to rely on non-existent evidence or
misperceptions about the making of laws. Caulfield
builds on this argument:
We do not make something a statutory criminal offence
simply to ensure oversight by elected officials. There must
be something about the specific act to warrant the application of the strongest of our regulatory tools . . . To date, these
clear justifications have been absent. And given the shifting
nature and moral ambiguity of the topic, I believe clear,
generally accepted rationales for many of the suggested statutory bans will always remain elusive. 155

The Law Commission of Canada has in the past
buttressed this view, stating that only ‘‘conduct which is
culpable, seriously harmful, and generally conceived of as
deserving of punishment’’ is within the proper reach of
the criminal law. 156 NRTs and NGTs, it seems, lack these
qualities. Indeed, the literature is replete with disagreement about the harmfulness of NRTs and NGTs, 157 and
demonstrable in public opinion as well. 158 Consensus at
the Parliamentary level (as a reflection of society) is therefore unachievable, so banning certain NRTs and NGTs
is wrong. 159
There are two definitional claims worth pulling
apart in this line of argument, namely, that the presence
of moral ambiguity is a bar to the use of statutory
prohibitions, and that the absence of consensus is a bar
to use of statutory prohibitions.
Moral Ambiguity Precludes the Use of Criminal
Bans
The counter to this claim is straightforward: prohibiting NRTs and NGTs is not problematic in view of the
existence of other morally ambiguous offences in the
Criminal Code. Euthanasia is a crime, yet approximately
70% of Canadians are in favour of legalizing physicianassisted suicide. 160 Criminal libel is another good
example — the harmfulness of this offence has been
challenged; however, the Supreme Court of Canada was
unwilling to limit Parliament’s power to define public
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wrongs. 161 Similarly, the supposed immorality of the
conduct typically ensnared by the obscenity provisions
has attracted heavy critique. 162 As Angela Campbell
urges:
[U]nanimous public views on the wrongfulness of an act is
not necessarily a requirement for such act [sic] to be validly
prohibited by Parliament. There are many acts in our
society that legislators have chosen to criminalize, even
though Canadians as a whole do not agree on their moral
blameworthiness. 163

What counts as culpable or morally blameworthy is
not contingent on an a priori demonstration of serious
harm. Courts are willing to infer harm and uphold criminal laws where the federal government is acting on
reasonable grounds. 164 The moral ambiguity claim as an
absolute bar to banning NRTs and NGTs is thus unpersuasive.
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Bans are Inappropriate in the Absence of a
Consensus View
In the opening of this paper, I suggested that dispute
over the employ of criminal bans has thwarted legislative
action. Society perhaps benefits from the delay:
[S]ociety has chosen, for a variety of reasons, to avoid
attempts at reaching a moral consensus. In such a field, then,
government sometimes acts wisely in refusing or failing to
regulate (by law) in order to allow debate and discussion to
proceed, and perhaps to encourage some moral consensus
to emerge. 165 [emphasis added]

Alternatively, legislative inaction may inspire
‘‘detachment or disengagement by individuals from
active participation in the political life of their community,’’ 166 which in turn ‘‘undermines any ability to forge a
consensus on common public projects, endeavours, or
goals’’. 167 In other words, by not taking a definitive stand
on the issues, disagreement persists, with little means for
constructive dialogue. As argued in the foregoing, statutory prohibitions neither pre-empt discussion nor spurn
all opportunity for dispute.
That there exists a causal relationship between the
fact of moral ambiguity and an inability to forge a consensus is an assumption deserving of scepticism. Bartha
Knoppers and Sonia Le Bris identified a number of
points of general consensus in 1991, 168 constituting nine
of the 10 activities prohibited by section 5 of Bill C-13,
including cloning, parthenogenesis, research on embryos
past 14 days of development, sex selection, extreme
forms of genetic engineering, inter-species fertilisation,
and the creation of chimeras. 169 The onset of stem cell
research and the ‘‘Dolly technique’’ perhaps alters these
points of agreement. However, aside from public
opinion polls, has there been any recent effort to gauge
by how much? Is consensus truly impossible, or is Parliament hesitant to test it?
More to the point, is the onus on Parliament to
demonstrate consensus? Given that absence of moral
ambiguity is non-essential to the definition of a crime,
the burden surely rests with those opposed to bans on
NRTs and NGTs to show that disagreement mandates a
strictly regulatory approach. Presumably, such critics will
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argue that in spite of this popular disagreement, the
regulatory body would enable NRT–NGT research and
related activities to proceed within reasonable limits.
In this respect it is important to distinguish between
two possible forms of consensus seeking. The query is,
which form is more optimal? Where consensus is
achieved through Parliamentary debate, it is normative
in the sense that it is a manifestation of the will of the
citizenry. On the other hand, consensus achieved
through debate in the Agency’s functioning is pragmatic
in the sense that it directly applies only to a single issue
or a single research proposal, and the decision is made by
appointed (as opposed to elected) officials. Normative
consensus is probably significantly harder to attain. It
comes down to whether one is comfortable with the
notion of a regulatory body deciding morally contentious matters while normative consensus fails to be pursued. Is the Agency the preferred ‘‘arbiter of fundamental
ethical issues on which there is no widespread agreement’’? 170
Thus, the moral ambiguity argument is vulnerable
from both angles: Moral ambiguity itself is not a bar to
the use of prohibitions. Moreover, the onus to demonstrate that lack of consensus is dire for the enactment of
criminal bans properly lies with those who argue against
bans on NRTs and NGTs.
It is nonetheless important to expressly confront
this moral ambiguity issue within the framework of the
Bill, signalling a commitment to initiate consensus
seeking. The Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies and Health Canada chose instead to assert
the existence of consensus. It is time to rethink this
approach. Critics of criminal bans on NRTs and NGTs
may then succumb to the ‘‘temptation to believe that
legislative attempts to secure recognition of one particular view at the expense of others would be the enforcement of moral majoritarianism.’’ 171

An Argument For More Argument

I

ndeed, a debate over the proper interaction of law and
morals, Hart-Devlin revisited again, is not obviously
blocked by my starting assumption that laws are needed
in this sphere. Whereas in my view neither structural nor
consequentialist arguments represent a threat to the
inclusion of statutory bans in Bill C-13, theoretical
claims remain viable, possibly invoking the issue of legal
moralism. Up to this stage, however, these potentially
more fruitful theoretical claims have mostly been impoverished. 172 Thus, all the arguments advanced against
criminal bans prove unpersuasive; equally, they fail to
substantiate a non-prohibitive alternative for NRT–NGT
regulation. Bill C-13 should therefore be proclaimed into
law. Commentators might then meaningfully engage
with criminal law theory. Arguments for and against the
prohibited activities should continue to be made in
order to realise the potential good of NRTs and NGTs
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(both from those that the Bill allows as well as those that
may not in future be subject to prohibition), and to
preclude or minimise the measure of harm from those
technologies. Deliberation should involve a wide constituency. Criminal bans can be enacted, scientists can challenge them, the Agency can challenge them, but

Canadians must take part in the discourse. Section 5 of
Bill C-13 would then contain a novel sort of prohibitions
(qualitatively less blunt than commentators to date
envisage) fitting for NRTs and NGTs. This would be a
much more appropriate result than an effective ban on
bans.
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